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Applying Genericide to the Right of
Publicity
Zoe Argento*

ABSTRACT

This article proposes applying genericide to the right of
publicity as a way to cabin the over-expansion of publicity rights. The
article offers a different approach than previous proposals, which seek
to either narrow the definition of publicity rights or bolster defenses,
such as the First Amendment.
Like trademark genericide, the
celebrity's image comes to refer to an idea, not to the identity of the
source of the product or to the identity of the celebrity. This article
proposes a test: whether the aspect of the celebrity's persona at issue
has been used in the public dialogue with a clearly separate meaning
over a long period of time. This test is designed to determine when the
primary significance to the public of the celebrity's image is no longer
the celebrity'spersonal identity. Genericide would enhance free speech
by putting culturalicons fully in the public domain. At the same time,
this article argues that celebrities would not substantially lose the right
to control use of their identities because, at the point at which a
celebrity's image would be subject to genericide, the public has already
appropriatedthe image and imbued it with a new meaning.
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In the age of mass media and the Internet, celebrities are
always with us. Generations ago, Americans may have alluded to
characters from the Bible and from books, but celebrities have
increasingly become our society's mode of reference-"the peculiar, yet
familiar idiom in which we conduct a fair portion of our cultural
business and everyday conversation."1 It is hardly groundbreaking to
point out that the names and images of celebrities acquire meaning
independent from their function of simply identifying the human
being behind the face. For example, when someone calls you an
"Einstein," she is not stating that you actually are the medium-height
man from Central Europe who expounded the theory of general
relativity. Einstein has become a synonym for "smart." Indeed, the
process by which a celebrity's persona acquires independent cultural
meaning closely parallels the process of genericide in trademark law.
This article will argue that once the primary significance to the public
of the celebrity's persona is no longer to identify the individual human
being but to function as a metaphor or symbol, the celebrity's public
persona should enter the public domain in the same way as a generic
trademark.
Genericide offers a novel solution to the over-expansion of the
right of publicity so often criticized by commentators.
Previous
proposals to curb the right of publicity fall roughly into two camps: (1)
narrower definitions of publicity rights 2 and (2) strengthened

1.
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 128 (1993).
2.
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291
(2003) (arguing that courts should cabin the right to evoke in order to avoid chilling free
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privileges and defenses to the right of publicity. 3 Genericide is a
different and perhaps more radical solution: after relatively high
hurdles have been surmounted, the celebrity would simply lose the
publicity right altogether.
This proposal would not, however, throw the baby out with the
proverbial bath water. Instead, genericide protects the essence of the
right of publicity while addressing the most serious criticism: the
stifling of free speech. Genericide would return the name or image of
a celebrity to the public domain precisely at the point at which the
celebrity's persona functions more as expressive speech than as an
identifier. Up to that point, celebrities would retain the right to
control the use of their identities. However, after that point the public
would obtain the right to expressive content, which the public itself
had largely poured into the celebrity's persona. More importantly, the
celebrity would lose the right to maintain a monopoly over ideas that
can only be expressed by the use of her name or image.
This article takes as its starting point a limited view of the
right of publicity. This approach, which is codified in the Lanham Act,
justifies the right of publicity as a way to protect the public against
false endorsement. 4 Genericide makes the most sense in this context.
Just as a trademark serves to link a manufacturer to a product, the
celebrity's name or image links the celebrity to the "product," thereby
serving as a personal endorsement. By the process of genericide,
however, the celebrity's name or image comes to convey some other
idea and no longer primarily signifies the identity of the celebrity to
the public. At that point, the celebrity's image does not function as an
endorsement and does not deserve protection under the endorsement
rationale.
Even when other rationales for the right of publicity, such as
human dignity, are considered, however, genericide still serves as a
expression); David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23

CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 92-93 (2005) (warning against a further expansion of
publicity rights by applying property-based reasoning).
See, e.g., Nannette Diacovo, Going Once, Going Twice, Sold: The First Sale
3.
Doctrine Defense in Right of Publicity Actions, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 57, 58
(1994) (arguing that "the first sale doctrine is a viable and necessary defense in publicity
actions"); F. Jay Dougherty, All the World's Not a Stooge: The "Transformativeness"Test for
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distributionof
a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003) (asserting that the application of copyright
principles to publicity rights does not provide adequate First Amendment protection); Alice
Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383
(1999) (arguing for a more expansive right of publicity rooted in Kantian principles of
autonomy).
See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); see also Parks v. LaFace
4.
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2003).
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useful counterweight to a right that seems to be metastasizing. In the
last twenty years, the right of publicity has expanded to cover almost
any identifying feature of a celebrity. 5 This has led to protection
against look-alikes, 6 sound-alikes, 7 and advertisements that merely
evoke a celebrity.8 However, a genericide analysis would winnow out
the elements that have a generic meaning and do not deserve
protection. For example, in White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that an advertisement that displayed a
robot with a blonde wig, an evening gown, standing on what appeared
to be the set of Wheel of Fortune, turning a block letter on a game
board, and holding a game-show hostess pose, established a claim that
the advertiser violated Vanna White's right to publicity. 9 Perhaps if
White's face had been used in the image, the non-endorsement
justifications for the right of publicity might give her a claim. 10
However, the clothes and pose have become a generic expression of a
game show hostess in our culture and should not be protected.
Part I of this article describes the right of publicity and lays out
the principal criticisms of it. Part II covers how genericide operates in
trademark law, and argues that, because of the parallel between
trademark and publicity rights, genericide makes sense in the right of
publicity. Part III discusses how genericide can be adjusted to fit the
right of publicity given several important differences from
trademarks. Next, in order to show how genericide would work in
practice, Part IV proposes a test for publicity rights genericide:

5.
See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 2, at 304-07 (discussing specific instances where an
attribute or reference other than a celebrity's likeness, such as a catchphrase or symbol,
was found to violate publicity rights); Westfall & Landau, supra note 2, at 91-93 (providing
examples in California common law of different identifying features, such as nicknames
and identifiable dress, found to violate a celebrity's publicity rights); Sudakshina Sen,
Comment, Fluency of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV.
739, 748-51 (1995) (discussing the Ninth Circuit's application of the right of publicity to the
evocation of a celebrity's identity).
6.
See, e.g., Allen v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New
York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984), affd, 110 A.D.2d 1095 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985).
7.
See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 9055981, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24838 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849
F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
8.
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.), amended
by No. 90-55840, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992); Motschenbacher v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
9.
White, 971 F.2d at 1396, 1399.
10.
The court found she did have a claim, but under a pure endorsement analysis, it
seems unlikely that the public would interpret the image as an endorsement by White
herself. See id. at 1399.
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whether the aspect of the celebrity's persona at issue has been used in
the public dialogue with a clearly separate meaning over a long period
of time. Based on analysis of uses in entertainment and news
contexts, a court could determine what the public understands by the
celebrity's name or image. The test is demonstrated in a case study of
how the test would be applied to the "Terminator" character from the
popular movie trilogy. Part V attempts to answer likely objections to
applying genericide to the right of publicity.
I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity originated in the right of privacy.1 1
Privacy rights had become inadequate to justify the courts' and state
legislators' sense that celebrities should still have some control of their
images, even when they appeared to have forfeited the right of privacy
by actively seeking the spotlight. 12 Thus, the term "right of publicity"
was first coined in a landmark case in 1953, Haelan Laboratories,Inc.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.13 The right of publicity has since become
a widely accepted right, one that is codified in the statutes of at least
eighteen states, 14 the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, 15 and
the Lanham Act. 16 Another eighteen states include some form of
publicity rights in their common law.1 7 The right of publicity usually,

11.
Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953). The right of privacy was first expounded in an article by Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren in 1890. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
12.
See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1941);
Paramount Pictures, Inc., v. Leader Press, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-08 (W.D. Okla.
1938), rev'd, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); see also Madow, supra note 1, at 169.
13.
202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
14.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344-3344.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
540.08 (West, Westlaw through 2007 amendment); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/10
(West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (LexisNexis 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170
(LexisNexis 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20202 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.790 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50
(McKinney 1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2741.02 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
839.1 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (West
2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3-3 (2005);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 63.60.010 (West 2005); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.50 (West, Westlaw through 2007
legislation).
15.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995).
16.
Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
17.
The states that include some form of publicity rights in their common law are
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Utah. 31 THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS, CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 121 § 5 (2006).
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though not always, involves three elements: (1) the plaintiff must
indeed be a celebrity; (2) an identifying feature of the celebrity must
be used; and (3) the use must cause damage to the commercial value of
the celebrity's persona.18 The requirements under the Lanham Act
are similar, but focus more heavily on consumer confusion as to the
source of a product on which the celebrity's name or image has been
placed. 19 Specifically, the Lanham Act requires that a celebrity show
that the use of her name is likely to confuse consumers as to whether
the celebrity has endorsed or sponsored the product by suggesting an
"affiliation, connection, or association" between the celebrity and the
defendant's goods or services, or the celebrity's participation in the
"origin, sponsorship, or approval" of the defendant's goods or
services. 20

Both state statutes and the Lanham Act reserve the right of
publicity
to
commercial
uses,
such
as
advertising
and
2
merchandising. ' Under current law, the public is generally free to
22
use the celebrity's identity for informational and entertainment uses.
Certainly, a lot is at stake with regard to who owns the right of
publicity. To give examples, Tiger Woods had grossed almost $647
million in endorsements in his career at the end of 2006.23 Elvis
Presley Enterprises, the for-profit organization that controls Elvis'
right of publicity, trademarks, and Graceland, generated $40 million
24
in 2004 alone.
Despite its century of existence and the well-developed state of
the identity-merchandising industry, the right of publicity is widely

18.

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 391.170; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A; N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50; VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-40; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46.

19.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
20.
Id.; see Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2003).
21.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08;
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 50; VA. CODE ANN.
COMPETITION § 46.
22.

§

8.01-40;

see also RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF UNFAIR

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47; Peter L. Felcher &

Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People By the Media, 88
YALE L.J. 1577, 1601-05 (1979); Madow, supra note 1, at 130-32; Westfall & Landau, supra
note 2, at 96-97.
23.
Ron Sirak, Profit Sharing: The Golf Digest 50 Are Not Only Making Millions,
They're Spreading the Riches, GOLF DIG., Feb.1, 2007, at 114.
24.
Lisa DiCarlo, Elvis Lives-In Merchandising, at Least, FORBES.COM, Oct. 28,
2004, http://www.forbes.com/2004/10/25/cx ld1025elvis.html.
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criticized in legal literature.2 5 In fact, some commentators question
whether the right of publicity should exist at all, 26 and many think it
is too expansive.2 7 In particular, the right of publicity's growth in
recent years to include a right to evoke, 28 descendability, 29 and rights
to the sound of a voice, 30 to name a few areas, has fueled debate.
Probably the most serious critique of the expanded right of
publicity is that it violates the First Amendment right of free speech. 31
The argument is two-pronged, focusing first on the importance of
celebrities to speech and, secondly, on the value of commercial speech.
With regard to the first prong, proponents point out that, for better or
32
for worse, celebrities are key features in the cultural landscape.
Everybody is familiar with celebrity images and, as a result, they are
quickly drafted into the service of our cultural dialogue.3
They
become metaphors and symbols capable of delivering punchy, concise
messages. 34 They allow like-minded people to identify each other and
to form interest groups-fan clubs are an obvious example. 35 They
help to provide a rich public domain from which a vibrant, common

25.
See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 2, at 295; Madow, supra note 1, at 238-40
(concluding that the case for the right of publicity is "not proven"); Westfall & Landau,
supra note 2, at 121-23; Sen, supra note 5, at 751-60.
26.
See, e.g., Madow, supra note 1, at 134; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (noting that "[tihe rationales underlying recognition of a
right of publicity are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks

or trade secrets").
27.
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, CabiningIntellectual Property Through a Property
Paradigm,54 DUKE L.J. 1, 22-24, 139-43 (2004); Madow, supra note 1; Westfall & Landau,
supra note 2, at 95-96; Sen, supra note 5, at 751-60; Steven C. Clay, Note, Starstruck: The
Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REV.
485, 501-13 (1994).
28.
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir.),
amended by No. 90-55840, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992).
29.
See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221-22 (2d Cir. 1978);
Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 844-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
30.
See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (9th Cir.), amended
by No. 90-55981, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24838 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1992); Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988).
31.
See Carrier, supra note 27, at 139-41; Madow, supra note 1, at 138-47; Sen,
supra note 5, at 752-60.
32.
Carrier, supra note 27, at 139-42; Madow, supra note 1, at 138-147; Sen, supra
note 5, at 753-55.
33.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We
Be Paying Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 123, 137-40 (1996) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols].
34.
See id. at 138; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
Hous. L. REV. 903, 910 (2003).
35.
Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols, supra note 33, at 139.
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culture draws. 36 Therefore, celebrities should not be allowed to control
the meanings associated with their images or to stifle dissenting
interpretations.
With regard to commercial speech, commentators argue that
differentiating between paintings and t-shirts, and between sitcoms
and advertisements, creates a false distinction between commercial
and non-commercial uses, and between high and low art.3 7 Both are

for sale and both are expressive. 38 Commercial speech, therefore,
should also be fully protected under the First Amendment.
The right of publicity is also criticized as exacerbating
imbalances in the distribution of power and money.39 Firstly, the
right of publicity supports the haves against the have-nots in economic
competition. Only large corporations can afford to pay for the use of a
celebrity's image for advertising and merchandising, to the
disadvantage of smaller companies who cannot afford access to the
selling power of a celebrity's persona. 40 Secondly, the right of publicity
41
skews more money to already successful and wealthy stars.
Moreover, competition suffers because only those who control the
42
celebrity image can sell merchandise bearing that image.
Publicity rights also cause an over-investment in "celebrity
production." 43 That is, the public receives vastly more information
about glamorous professions, like athletics and entertainment, than
about other more mundane lines of work. Arguably, this causes
people whose talents would be of better use to society as engineers, for
example, to waste phenomenal amounts of effort striving to become

36.
See Steven Cordero, Cocaine-Cola,the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending
the Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 599, 653 (1998); see also Sen, supra note 5, at 759.
37.
See Volokh, supra note 34, at 908-10; see also Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley,
What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162,
1175-78, 1217-18 (2006) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can
Learn].
38.
See id.
39.
Madow, supra note 1, at 136-37; see generally JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED
CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW (1991) (analyzing visual and audio images
in popular culture from various legal perspectives).
40.
See Madow, supra note 1, at 223-24.
41.
See id. at 136-37.
42.
See Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, The MerchandisingRight: Fragile Theory or
Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 481-82 (2005) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, The
Merchandising Right]. Though this Dogan & Lemley article focuses on trademark
merchandising, the same principle should apply to publicity rights merchandising.
43.
Madow, supra note 1, at 216-18. "Celebrity production" is the cultural output
resulting from celebrities--"the jokes and songs we would not otherwise hear, the slam
dunks and dance moves we would not otherwise see." Id. at 216.
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celebrities. 44 At the same time, celebrities may have too much
influence over society in the first place. 45 Why, for example, should
the political opinions of Britney Spears be sought out and broadcast to
46
the nation?
Proponents of the cultural studies movement argue that
celebrities' images have public meaning to which the public has a
stronger right than does the celebrity. 47 That is, they contend that
celebrities have no particular right to their public image because their
images are created by the public. The most influential work on public
ownership of the right of publicity is Michael Madow's Private
48
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights.
This critique is related to the First Amendment argument in that
cultural studies proponents agree that fencing off celebrity names and
images from public discourse inhibits free speech. The cultural
studies movement, however, takes this argument a step further by
contending not only that celebrity personas are necessary for public
discourse, but also that the public created (or at least had a large part
in creating) the celebrity's public meaning in the first place. 49 The
cultural studies argument is based on the idea that the public does not
just uncritically consume mass media wholesale. 50 Rather, consumers
"'recode' cultural and even industrial commodities in ways that better
serve their particular needs and interests.."5 1 They pour new meaning
44.
See id. at 216.
45.
Id. at 227-28.
46.
See, e.g., Geoffrey O'Brien, Is it All Just a Dream?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 12,
2004, at 17, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17315 (noting that Michael
Moore's documentary Fahrenheit 9/11 included, in its expression of a political message,
"the exquisite lip-glossed vacuousness of Britney Spears expressing her unquestioning
support for the President").
47.
See, e.g., Madow, supra note 1.
48.
Madow, supra note 1.
49.
See Madow, supra note 1, at 139.
50.
Id. at 139; see also GAINES, supranote 39, at 228-40.
51.
See Madow, supra note 1, at 139; see also Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 (1999). For example, in the early 1990s, the television
show character, Murphy Brown, became a heavily-contested symbol of single motherhood.
JOHN FISKE, MEDIA MATTERS: EVERYDAY CULTURE AND POLITICAL CHANGE 21-29 (1994).
Madow notes that John Wayne and Judy Garland were film stars whose images were
recoded by the gay community to take on new meanings. Madow, supra note 1, at 144-45,
194-95. For the gay community, instead of representing untroubled masculinity, John
Wayne came to represent the sense of being trapped by the requirements of machismo. See
id. at 144-45. John Wayne's image was displayed on a greeting card wearing bright red
lipstick with the caption, "It's such a bitch being butch." Id. at 144. Similarly, Judy
Garland's wholesome "girl next door" image was reworked to signify the fragile self-image
of gay males. See id. at 194-95. "[A]fter Garland's firing by MGM and her suicide attempt,
urban gay men found in Garland's image, particularly her androgyny and fragile faqade of
normality, a powerful means of 'speaking to each other about themselves."' Id. at 194.
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into mass media images and symbols, appropriating them to create
52
their own language.
Finally, critics argue that, regardless of whether or not a
precise harm can be identified, the law should not grant a right where
there is no clear benefit for doing so. The critics in this camp point out
that the right of publicity is unnecessary because aspiring celebrities
do not need additional incentives to become famous. 53 Rather,
celebrities who can capitalize on their publicity rights are generally
wealthy and successful already.5 4 Moreover, celebrity endorsements
are hardly a scarce commodity that must be privately owned in order
to prevent a tragedy of the "celebrity commons." 55 There is little
evidence to show that more use decreases the value of a celebrity's
image. 56 As regards moral arguments, such as labor rights and unjust
enrichment, it is not at all clear that celebrities "deserve" the entire
Celebrities' images generally
commercial value of their images.
borrow heavily from the public domain, 57 and owe much of their
popularity to pure luck 58 and to the meaning the public invests into
them. 59 Additionally, to the extent that a celebrity's image is created
through labor, much of the labor is contributed by others, including
screenwriters, advertising executives, make-up specialists, and
publicists.60

52.
Madow, supra note 1, at 139; see CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE: WORKING
PAPERS IN CULTURAL STUDIES, 1972-79 128, 134-39 (Stuart Hall et al. eds, 1980); David
Lange, Recognizing the PublicDomain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 165 (1981).
53.
Madow, supra note 1, at 207-15.

54.

Id.

Id. at 220-25.
55.
Id. at 221-22.
56.
Lange, supra note 52, at 161-63, 171-72. For example, Madonna drew on a long
57.
tradition of ultra-glamorous Hollywood blondes to construct her charged, sexual image. See
Madow, supra note 1, at 196 ("[T]ake Madonna, whose entire persona . . . is an ironic
rework of the Hollywood myth of 'the Blonde.' How much does she owe to Marilyn Monroe?
To the directors ... who made the films in which Monroe appeared? ... In short .... how
much has Madonna 'invented' and how much has she 'converted."' (internal citations
omitted)).
Madow, supra note 1, at 185-91. In particular, Madow discusses how Einstein's
58.
fame was "'by no means inevitable."' Id. (quoting Marshall Missner, Why Einstein Became
Famous in America, 15 SOC. STUD. SCI. 267, 288 (1985)).
See id. at 139, 192-96; see also CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE: WORKING PAPERS
59.
IN CULTURAL STUDIES, supra note 52, at 134-39; Lange, supra note 52, at 165.
See Madow, supra note 1, at 191-92.
60.
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II. GENERICIDE AS A SOLUTION TO THE OVER-EXPANSIVE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY
As has been mentioned, proposals to curb the right of publicity
basically take two approaches: those that suggest the right of publicity
should be more narrowly defined 6 and those that would strengthen
62
privileges and defenses against the right of publicity.
With regard to the first line of attack, Stacey Dogan, for
example, in An Exclusive Right to Evoke, contends that the right of
publicity should not be used by the courts to prohibit blindly any
evocation of the celebrity in the mind of the public. 63 Dogan suggests
instead that publicity rights be rigorously limited to cases in which
the public is likely to be confused as to whether the celebrity endorsed
64
the use.
Others, such as David Westfall and David Landau, in Publicity
Rights as Privacy Rights, argue that if the right of publicity is to be
considered a property right, careful thought should be given to
limiting publicity rights to only certain metaphorical sticks in the
bundle of property rights. 65 Just because the right of publicity can be
conceived of as a property right, they point out, does not mean that
publicity rights should have the same status as traditional forms of
property, like real estate. 66 Alice Haemmerli, in Whose Who? The Case
for a Kantian Right of Publicity, even suggests regrounding the right
67
of publicity in Kantian principles of personal autonomy.

61.
See, e.g., Dogan, supra note 2, at 320 (proposing limiting evocation rights in the
right of publicity context to those "cases involving likelihood of confusion as to
endorsement"); Haemmerli, supra note 3, at 411-22 (proposing a new basis for publicity
rights grounded in Kantian principles of autonomy); Westfall & Landau, supra note 2, at
122 (suggesting that publicity rights should be limited to just some property rights-for
example, to the right to assign-but not to descendability rights).
62.
See, e.g., Diacovo, supra note 3, at 80-92 (proposing a first sale doctrine defense
to right of publicity actions); Dougherty, supra note 3, at 467-73 (proposing a "medium of
distribution" test for the First Amendment defense against the right of publicity); see also
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 418-24 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity] (proposing that the expressivity of a trademark be a defense against trademark
rights). Dreyfuss' expressive genericide idea could be applied to publicity rights, as well as,
trademark rights.
63.
See Dogan, supra note 2, at 319-21 (arguing, however, that the right to evoke
should encompass an exclusive right to evoke when evocation is likely to cause confusion).
64.
Id. at 320.
65.
See Westfall & Landau, supra note 2, at 121-23.
66.
See id. at 80-83.
67.
Haemmerli, supra note 3, at 411-22 ("[I]n a Kantian system, property is
inseparably associated with one's 'personhood' because property grows out of freedom and
freedom is essential to personhood. As to whether a person should be able to claim a

332

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:2:321

In the second line of attack, commentators have suggested
defenses to the right of publicity, such as more liberal First
Amendment approaches 68 and copyright law's First Sale Doctrine. 69
One line of First Amendment reasoning focuses on commercial speech.
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, in Who Put the Right in the Right of
Publicity?, points out that the right of publicity is so dependent on
expressive forms of commercial speech that if commercial speech were
to be more closely guarded, as trends in First Amendment
70
jurisprudence indicate, the right of publicity might not survive.
Critics have argued more generally that the right of publicity stifles
cultural dialogue. 71
They variously propose new transformative
tests, 72 a greater parody exception, 73 an exception for metaphors,74 and
75
exceptions for cultural icons.
Genericide would constitute a third approach to limiting the
right of publicity. Instead of a mediation between stricter definitions
and competing rights, genericide would simply abolish the right of
publicity at the point where the primary significance to the public of
the celebrity's name or image was no longer that of the individual
celebrity. This would be a standard of last resort. The celebrity would
have achieved iconic status and would probably already be deceased.
I do not suggest that genericide is some sort of cure-all-far
from it. However, genericide has the advantage of a drawing a line
beyond which the right of publicity could not go, thereby cabining the
trend of expansion. The following discussion will show how to apply
the trademark principle of genericide to the closely related field of
publicity rights.

property right in the use of her objectified identity, there is no logical reason why she
should not and every reason why she should.").
68.
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 53-82 (1998); see Madow, supra note 1, at 140-43; Sen,
supra note 5, at 755-60. See generally Dougherty, supra note 3, at 71-73 (proposing a
"medium of distribution test," which would require "judges to decide what works of visual
art qualify as First Amendment-protected speech"); Volokh, supra note 34, at 908-13
(discussing the right of publicity from a First Amendment perspective).
69.
See generally Diacovo, supra note 3, at 58 (asserting that "the first sale doctrine
is a viable and necessary defense in publicity actions").
70.
See Zimmerman, supra note 68, at 53-82.
71.
Madow, supra note 1, at 142-47.
72.
See Volokh, supra note 34, at 916-24.
73.
See Sen, supra note 5, at 755-60.
74.
See David S. Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing Jell-O to a Wall: The Vanna
White Case and the Limits of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67, 76-84 (1995).
75.
See Cordero, supra note 36, at 639-53.
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A. Genericide
At common law, genericide was a natural corollary to
trademark law and, therefore, came into existence with the modern
definition of trademark. 76 This is because modern trademark rights
77
have traditionally been rooted in a competition-promotion rationale.
The reasoning proceeds as follows: manufacturers have no incentive to
build a good product unless consumers can match a particular product
to a particular manufacturer. 78 Consumers reward manufacturers
who create high-quality products by buying more from those
manufacturers. 79 As a result, when a trademark no longer serves to
identify the source of a product, no justification remains for its
existence. The process by which trademarks come to indicate the
product itself, rather than the source of the product, is known as
genericide.
The Ninth Circuit, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., stated
the process of genericide clearly: "An originally non-generic, valid
trademark becomes generic and invalid when the principal
significance of the word to the public becomes the indication of the
nature or class of an article, rather than the indication of the article's
origin."' 0 Thus, genericide occurs when the trademark comes to refer
either to the nature of a product or to a class of products. The
genericide of the term "thermos" is a good example.8 1 Originally,
"Thermos" referred only to the brand of containers made by the KingSeeley Thermos Company.8 2 However, the term came to signify the
83
nature of the product itself: an airtight, insulated drink container.

The Ninth Circuit, in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Industries,
Inc., held that the term "thermos" had entered the public domain and
76.

Although guild practices had required the use of marks to prevent the passing

off of false or defective wares since the Middle Ages, systematic legal protection for

trademarks

did not begin until the early nineteenth

COPYRIGHT,

PATENT,

TRADEMARK

AND RELATED

STATE

century. PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
DOCTRINES

219

(4th ed.,

Foundation Press 1997) (1973). The tort of trademark infringement originated in unfair
competition. Id. Specifically, defendants were found to violate trademark law when marks
used on products were intended to confuse consumers as to the source of the product. Id.
77.
Id. at 219; see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987).
78.
Landes & Posner, supra note 77, at 268-70.
79.
Id.
80.
692 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church
& Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1332 (7th Cir. 1977)).
...
81.
See King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1963).
82.
Id. at 578.
83.
Id. at 578-79.
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that King-Seely Thermos Company's competitors were free to use the
term (confined by the court to use with a lower-case "t" only) to
describe their products.8 4 Other examples of generic names that
originated

in

cellophane, 88

trampoline,8 9 and

trademarks

are

escalator,8 5

aspirin,8 6

yo-yo,8 7

steak. 90

cube
Genericide is also codified in section 14(3) of the Lanham Act. 91
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office may, upon petition, "cancel a
registration of a mark" when "the registered mark becomes the
generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which
it is registered, or is functional. '92 The test used to determine whether
a mark has become generic, the "primary significance test," is included
in the same section of the Lanham Act: "The primary significance of
the registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser
motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered
mark has become the generic name ....

,,93

B. GenericideApplied to the Right of Publicity

This article's limited view of the right of publicity is based on
an endorsement rationale. Arguably, the right of publicity makes the
most sense as a mechanism to protect the public from false
endorsement. 94 As will be discussed, the other justifications for the
right of publicity have been seriously criticized. 95 The endorsement
rationale, at a minimum, protects consumers from confusion.
Genericide should apply to the right of publicity as the logical
corollary to a publicity right based on endorsement. Even if the right
of publicity is not limited to protection against false endorsement,
however, genericide makes sense because the connection between the

84.
Id. at 581.
85.
See Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80, 81 (Comm'r
Pats. Apr. 3, 1950).
86.
See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
87.
See Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir.
1965).
88.
See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 76 (2d Cir. 1936).
89.
See Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Am. Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745, 747 (S.D.
Iowa 1961).
90.
See Spang v. Watson, 205 F.2d 703, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
91.
See Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000).
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
See Dogan & Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn, supra note 37, at
1190-91.
95.
See infra Part V.
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celebrity and her image becomes so attenuated when the public no
longer sees her in the image, but rather assigns an independent
meaning to the image. At that point, the celebrity no longer has
control over the image. The meaning of the image has essentially
been constructed and overtaken by the public.
Like the trademark right, the right of publicity grants a right
to profit from the goodwill built up in a name. 96 Focusing on the right
of publicity's endorsement justification narrows the gap still more. In
both, the boundary of the right of publicity is defined by the confusion
of the consumer. 97 Trademark infringement occurs when use of the
registered mark causes confusion in consumers as to the source of the
mark. 98 Similarly, in the right of publicity, infringement occurs when
the use of the celebrity's persona confuses the consumer as to whether
the celebrity endorsed the use. 99
Otherwise, any golf ball
manufacturer, for example, could put Tiger Woods' picture on its golf
ball can. On the federal level, the right of publicity protects the
source-identifying function of the right of publicity. Section 43(a)(1)
essentially prohibits
commercial
use that falsely suggests
endorsement. 100 In fact, the right of publicity codified in the Lanham
Act uses language similar to the language establishing the federal
trademark right. 101

96.
See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("This
common law publicity right is analogous to a commercial entity's right to profit from the
'goodwill' it has built up in its name."); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("The 'right of publicity' is somewhat akin to the exclusive right of a
commercial enterprise to the benefits to be derived from the goodwill and secondary
meaning that it has managed to build up in its name."); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CAL. L. REV. 383, 423 (1960) (noting that appropriation cases "create in effect, for every
individual, a common law trade name, his own, and a common law trade mark in his
likeness").
97.
See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
98.
See Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) ("Any person who shall,
without the consent of the registrant-(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.").
99.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:15 (4th ed. 2007).
100.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
101.
See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2003) (grounding a
right of publicity claim under federal law in section 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)); accord Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir.),
amended by No. 90-55981, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 24838 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1992); Allen v.
Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham
Act states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
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Given the fact that trademark law and the right of publicity
are so similar, it makes sense to apply the limiting principle of
genericide from trademark law to the right of publicity. In the U.S.,
10 2 It
genericide has been part of common law since at least the 1830s.
has become a flexible, well-articulated, and nuanced rule over the last
two centuries.' 0 3 Certainly, it seems simpler to employ an already
well-established limitation than to create new ones from whole cloth,
04
as commentators such as Haemmerli have suggested.
Genericide would operate with regard to the right of publicity
in a manner parallel to the way it does with trademarks. The name
and image of a famous person, at the beginning of his or her ascent to
fame, refers only to that human being. Over time, however, through
increased fame, the name and image of the celebrity begin taking on
independent meaning from the person underlying the public
persona. 0 5 The celebrity's name or image begins to refer to a concept,
behavior, attitude, or style. 10 6 For the sake of convenience, this article
will refer to a celebrity's name and image collectively as his "persona":
the combination of aspects that constitute the celebrity's public
personality. The celebrity's public persona is distinct from the unique,
personal identity of the individual human being.
The primary significance of the celebrity's persona eventually
refers not to the source of the celebrity-the individual human beingbut to an independent meaning. Using the previously mentioned
Einstein example, "Einstein," in common speech, more often than not,
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
102.
See, e.g., Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. 214, 216-17 (1837).
103.
See John Dwight Ingram, The Genericideof Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 154, 161-62 (2004); J. Andrew McKinney, Jr., Avoiding Trademark Genericide, 37 MD.
B.J. 28, 30-31 (2004).
104.
See generally Haemmerli, supra note 3 (proposing that Kantian notions of
autonomy should be applied to right of publicity actions).
105.
Madow, supra note 1, at 194-96 (giving the example of Judy Garland's
appropriation by urban gay males); see supra note 51.
106.
See GAINES, supra note 39, at 228-40; Madow, supra note 1, at 193-95; Sen,
supra note 5, at 753-54.
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does not refer specifically to the human being who grew up in
Germany and died in Princeton, New Jersey; instead, it is an adjective
describing a thinker of extraordinary insight and deep understanding
of the universe--"Einstein,"
in short, has become a synonym for
"genius."10 7
Courts have already recognized the layering of meaning onto
the persona of a celebrity.108 Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Capece is a
good example. 10 9
The defendant, Barry Capece, established a
nightclub, called "The Velvet Elvis," with a 1960s era theme. 1 10
Among other Elvis Presley-inspired features, the nightclub displayed
a painting of Elvis on velvet."'
Elvis Presley Enterprises, the
organization that inherited Elvis Presley's trademark and publicity
rights, sued Capece on several grounds, including violation of Elvis'
right of publicity."12 Specifically, Elvis Presley Enterprises objected to
Capece's use of Elvis' name in "The Velvet Elvis," and to the use of
Elvis' image throughout the club. 1 3 The court ruled in favor of Capece
on the right of publicity, stating that the phrase "The Velvet Elvis" did
"not amount to an unauthorized commercial exploitation of the
identity of Elvis Presley" so much as an "art form reflective of an era
14
that Elvis helped to shape."
In fact, the court in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. essentially
described genericide without using the word:
[T]his phrase is not the thumbprint, work product, or tangible expression of Elvis
Presley's celebrity identity. The mere association of a phrase or expression with a

107.
For examples of use in the common language, see STEVE DEGREGORIO,
CONFESSIONS OF A STALKER: EPISODE ONE 29 (2000); KATHY ETLING, THE ART OF
WHITETAIL DECEPTION: CALLING, RATTLING, AND DECOYING-MAKE BIG BUCKS HUNT
You! 74 (Creative Outdoors 2004) (2002); and JOHN NICHOLS, THE MAGIC JOURNEY 445
(1978).
108.
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,
972-73 (10th Cir. 1996); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 802 (S.D.
Tex. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
109.
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 783.
110.
Id. at 788.
111.
Id.
112.
Id. at 789.
113.
Id.
114.
Id. at 802. Notably, the district court's opinion was reversed by the Fifth Circuit
on appeal. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 207 (5th Cir. 1998).
However, the Fifth Circuit did not overturn the district court's ruling on the right of
publicity, holding that it did not have to reach the issue of publicity rights because the
court could grant Elvis Presley Enterprises the remedy it sought on trademark
infringement alone. Id. at 205 n.8. Given the Fifth Circuit's reasoning on the trademark
issues, however, it seems almost certain that it would have overturned the district court's
decision on the right of publicity had it reached that issue. See id. at 200-05 (analyzing a
claim of trademark infringement).
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celebrity without the intent or effect of exploiting
115 his identity or persona is
insufficient cause for a violation of publicity rights.

Thus, the court distinguished between the individual human being
and the layering of association onto the celebrity's persona by the
public.
The court in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. recognized a
common phenomenon: that the use of a celebrity's persona can be
1 16
purely expressive and removed from the underlying human being.
The court described the process unambiguously: "Here, the image of
Elvis, conjured up by way of velvet paintings, has transcended into an
iconoclastic form of art that has a specific meaning in our culture,
which surpasses the identity of the man represented in the
painting."1 1 7 To analogize to trademark law, "thermos" has come to
mean more than the source (the manufacturer).
The public
understands "thermos" to refer to the nature of the product itself: an
airtight, insulated container. Similarly, the word "Elvis" and Elvis'
image have come to mean more than just the name or identity of the
man.
It refers to a layering of associations and meanings
superimposed by the public, and "The Velvet Elvis" has become a
byword for the gaudy, overblown style of the 1960s.
In fact, someone as famous as Elvis has many different
meanings and associations. To name two immediately understood
images, there is "young Elvis"-an icon of virility and rock and rolland "old Elvis"-symbolizing the flamboyant, bizarre excess of
superstardom. These meanings are instantaneously apparent to a
member of American culture (perhaps even of world culture).
Meanwhile, Elvis has entered our language. For example, the phrase
"Elvis has left the building" has come to mean "death" or "the show is
over." 8 The fact that Elvis cannot be distilled into one adjective, as

115.
Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 792 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
116.
See id.
117.
Id. (emphasis added).
118.
"When Elfan Jerry Glanville resigned as Houston Oilers coach in 1990, and was
fired by the Atlanta Falcons in 1994, the media could not resist the convenient 'Elvis has
left the building' leads and farewells in their coverage." GEORGE PLASKETES, IMAGES OF
ELVIS PRESLEY IN AMERICAN CULTURE, 1977-1997: THE MYSTERY TERRAIN 153 (1997). The

phrase has entered popular entertainment culture as well:
In the similarly sinister setting of Bad Influence (1990), the secretly depraved
Alex (Rob Lowe) utters an Elvis catchphrase to pronounce a person dead.
Standing over the still-warm body, the creepy character casually intones, "Elvis
has left the building," as if administering his victim's last rites. The same phrase
punctuates a triumphant strike in a battle against earth invaders in
Independence Day (1996).
Id. at 216; see also FRANK ZAPPA, Elvis Has Just Left the Building, on BROADWAY THE
HARD WAY (Zappa Records 1988).
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"Einstein" can be into "genius," does not mean that the associations
with Elvis are vague and illusory-quite the opposite. Elvis not only
has a variety of associations in our culture, 119 but his persona stands
for meanings that cannot be accurately expressed without the word
"Elvis" or Elvis' image.
As Rochelle Dreyfuss observed in Expressive Genericity:
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, the meaning of a
word can often only be expressed by that word. 120 In addition to its
core denotation, a word trails a host of associated meanings. 12 1 For
example, the core denotation of "Einstein" may be the same as the core
denotation of "genius," but "Einstein" also carries unique connotations:
a bushy-haired, absent-minded, loveable type of genius. Moreover, the
particular associations of a word enhance understanding: "[P]articular
usages [of a word] can require listeners to consider several
denotations, their respective connotations, and the connections
between them. This effort can lead to a new level of understanding,
which might not have been achieved by words lacking the same
associational set. 1 2 2
Aside from linguistic studies, it is a generally understood
principle in First Amendment jurisprudence that forbidding use of a
particular word impermissibly suppresses meaning and expression.
As the Supreme Court stated in Cohen v. California, "we cannot
indulge in the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words
without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process."' 2 3 As a matter of common sense, Mark Twain's observation
rings true: "The difference between the almost-right word [and] the
right word is really a large matter-it's the difference between the

119.
See generally PAMELA CLARKE KEOGH, ELVIS PRESLEY: THE MAN. THE LIFE.
THE LEGEND (2004) (providing a detailed biography of Elvis Presley and discussing the farreaching impact he had on American culture); PLASKETES, supra note 118 (discussing

Elvis' impact on culture after his death, including discussions of "Elvisynergy,"
"Elvisology," and "Elvisitations"); SAMUEL ROY, ELVIS, PROPHET OF POWER (1985) (tracing
Elvis' various careers and explaining his charisma and presence as a "social phenomenon").
See Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 62, at 413-16.
120.
Id. at 413-14.
121.
Id. at 414.
122.
123.
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). But see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 546-47 (1987) and MGM-Pathe Communications
Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), for cases that have
required defendants to use substitute words, even when the words at issue have an
arguably unique meaning.
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lightning bug and the lightning." 124 The same principle should apply
to expressive use of iconic celebrities.
C. Trademark Law and the Right of Publicity
One might object that publicity rights are not a perfect parallel
to trademark rights.
The right of publicity's concern with
endorsement might seem significantly removed from trademark's
concern with source identification. For example, consumers might
believe that when "Corningware" is stamped on their dish the Corning
Corporation actually made the dish. In contrast, when people see
Madonna's face on a mug, no one assumes that Madonna actually
made the mug. However, trademark rights cover a wide range of uses.
The use of sports logos, in particular, is comparable to the use of a
Madonna's face; consumers certainly do not think the Red Sox
franchise actually wove the hat that bears the Red Sox logo. In fact,
the connection between the manufacturer and the brand is quite
remote in most products.
The majority of retail items are
manufactured by contractors in developing countries across the
world. 125 Moreover, a single trademark may cover an array of
products as diverse as alarm clocks and maple syrup. 126 When a
corporation decides to put its trademark on a product, the consumer
can only hope that the corporation has enforced some standard of
quality in the creation of the product. This tenuous connection
between the corporation and its trademarked products is quite similar
to an endorsement by the celebrity of a product bearing the celebrity's
image.
Even if the endorsement justification for the right of publicity
is equivalent to the source identification function of a trademark,
there is still the objection that the right of publicity rests on
justifications independent of endorsement. The Third Restatement of
Unfair Competition gives five rationales, in addition to the
endorsement rationale, for the right of publicity: (1) protection of the
individual's interest in personal dignity and autonomy; (2) protection

124.
PHRASES,

JOHN
AND

BARTLETT,
PROVERBS

FAMILIAR
TRACED

TO

QUOTATIONS:
THEIR

A COLLECTION

SOURCES

IN ANCIENT

OF
AND

PASSAGES,
MODERN

LITERATURE 527 (Justin Kaplan, ed., Little, Brown and Co. 16th ed. 1992) (1875).
125.
See PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
Two-Thirds of U.S. Consumer Products
Companies Are Outsourcing, PricewaterhouseCoopers Survey Finds, Jun. 1, 2006,
http://www.barometersurveys.com/production/barsurv.nsf/vwAlNewsByDocID/E3BE486DO
29F3A248525717FO06E5BOD.
126.
See, e.g., L.L. BEAN, INC., CHRISTMAS 2007 CATALOG, available at
http://www.llbean.com/shop/shopByCatalog/kk/catalog.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2007).
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of the labor invested into creating a public personality; (3) prevention
of unjust enrichment by those exploiting the celebrity's persona; (4)
prevention of excessive use that dilutes the commercial value of the
identity; and (5) creation of an incentive to become a celebrity. 12 7
Given these widely different justifications for a right of publicity,
knocking out the endorsement leg with genericide still leaves the right
of publicity standing securely on five other legs.
Part V of this article will address possible criticisms of right of
publicity genericide based on the independent justifications for the
publicity right.
Without going into detail, however, the other
rationales for publicity rights have been widely criticized. 128 Indeed,
in the cases in which genericide would apply, these rationales are
strained to the breaking point. Genericide would recognize that
celebrities should not have control over meanings created by the
public with only an attenuated connection to their personal identities.
At the same time, the right of publicity is seen by many as too
broad. 12 9 Thus, the solution to the mushrooming of the right of
publicity may well be a re-grounding within the traditional and well13 0
established strictures of trademark law.
III. ADJUSTING GENERICIDE FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The endorsement and source identification rationales of
publicity and trademark rights are similar, but the subjects covered by
these rights still differ greatly. The trademark right protects a
specific mark: a word, for example, created in someone's
imagination.1 31 The publicity right, in contrast, protects the identity
of a real human being. 132 A person is not the same as a product; 133

127.
128.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995).
See Madow, supra note 1.

129.

See supra text accompanying notes 25-60.

130.
See Dogan & Lempley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn, supra note 37, at
1220 (arguing that "trademark law should serve as the baseline for defining and limiting
the right of publicity").
131.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) ("The term 'trademark' includes any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... ").
132.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 ("One who appropriates

the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name,
likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability .... ).
133.
Of course, many trademarks represent people. Sports team and musical group
trademarks represent groups of people and often come to be closely identified with a lead
player or singer. See, e.g., Beck, Trademark Registration No. 3,130,525 (filed July 18, 2003)
(a trademark for musical recordings by the musician, Beck Hansen.). Movie and television
show trademarks stand for the actors involved. For example, Oprah Winfrey uses her first
name as a trademark for her television show. See Oprah, Trademark Registration No.
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obviously, the differences between a human being and a product or
mark are profound. For the purpose of this inquiry, however, two
basic distinctions seem relevant: people are more complex than
trademarked products, and people are not interchangeablein the same
way that products are.
A. Adjusting Genericide to the Complexity of Human Beings
With regard to the complexity of people, there may not even be
a way to describe the extent of different facets and layers that go into
the constitution of a human being. On a superficial level, a famous
person's public face may be completely different from the face he
shows to his family. On a deeper level, people have emotional,
intellectual, spiritual, and social aspects. How can this compare to a
product, even the most complex? More to the point, how can a whole
person become "generic"?

As discussed above, applying genericide to the right of publicity
would occur when a celebrity's persona has acquired independent
meaning. However, a celebrity presents many different sides to the
public. Not all sides of a celebrity have equal exposure to the public or
acquire independent meaning. The multifaceted nature of a human
being should mean, therefore, that only aspects of the celebrity that
have acquired independent meaning should become generic.
A good example of a celebrity who may not have acquired
independent meaning as a whole is Jackie Onassis. 134 Many Jackie 0.
images, such as those depicting her as a child, a publisher, and so on,

do not signify anything other than a representation of the person
herself. On the other hand, the image of Jackie wearing a scarf and
large sunglasses may have taken on its own meaning in our culture. 13 5
136
Arguably, the image symbolizes inaccessible, high-class glamour.
1,726,373 (filed May 24, 1991) (a trademark for use with "entertainment services rendered
through the medium of television in the nature of a variety talk show series"). Service
marks stand for the services provided by people. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ("The
term 'service mark' means any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used] to identify and distinguish the services of one person ....").Moreover, even
trademarks that do not represent people often represent complex, abstract concepts-what
Jessica Litman, in Breakfast with Batman, calls "atmospherics." Litman, supra note 51, at
1730 (noting, for example, that women who use a L'OrealTM product may associate using
the product with boosting their self-esteem, murmuring to themselves 'and I'm worth it."').
134.
See generally Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that Jackie Onassis' identity was impermissibly appropriated in an
advertisement that included her likeness in the form of a photograph of a lookalike).
135.

See id. at 261-62; TINA SANTI FLAHERTY, WHAT JACKIE TAUGHT Us: LESSONS

FROM THE REMARKABLE LIFE OF JACQUELINE KENNEDY ONASSIS 51 (2004).

136.

See FLAHERTY, supra note 135, at 50-53.
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A possible objection to the idea of dividing a celebrity's public
persona into different aspects is that even one aspect might be too
broad. That is, if Jackie's scarf and sunglasses alone are enough to
signify inaccessible, high-class glamour, why should members of the
public who want to use the image get to use Jackie's face as well?
Each "aspect" of the celebrity's persona could be broken down into its
elements, with an analysis of whether each one was necessary to
express the idea. A critic might argue, for example, that Jackie's face
should not be used unless it was both necessary to express the idea
and the image as a whole was generic (i.e., the primary significance is
communicative). Such an analysis would arguably provide the perfect
balance between a celebrity's right to her image and the public's right
37
to the ideas expressed by the image.'
However, this analysis goes too far. It is true that genericide in
publicity rights has a certain paradoxical result. On the one hand, the
more famous and expressive the image, the fewer elements of the
image that are needed to express whatever idea the image holds. For
example, an image can suggest Groucho Marx using only a bushy
mustache, eyebrows, and round glasses. On the other hand, the more
famous the image, and the more it begins to take on an independent
meaning, the more generic it becomes. That is, the genericizing effect
of fame militates toward the celebrity losing control over what her
image means.
If the justification for the right of publicity is source
identification, the only issue that should matter is whether the
primary significance of the image is source identifying to the public or
symbolizes something else. In that case, as long as people understand
the picture of Jackie with sunglasses and a scarf primarily to mean
high-class glamour and only secondarily to depict Jackie, there is no
need to analyze each element separately.
If other justifications for the right of publicity besides the
endorsement rationale are given credence, a balancing test may make
sense. The celebrity's right to control her image would be balanced
against the extent to which elements of her image had entered the

137.
This is more or less what courts do to determine whether a work infringes a
copyright or trademark. See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g
Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1989) (balancing, in a trademark case, between
"allowing artistic expression and preventing consumer confusion"); Yankee Publ'g Inc. v.
News Am. Publ'g Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (balancing, in a trademark
case, between "exclusive right to use a set of words or symbols in trade ... [and the] free
speech rights of others"); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 712
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (balancing, in a copyright case, between protection of the "particular
expression of an idea ...[and protection of] the idea itself").
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public domain. At the least, this line of reasoning would eliminate
"evocation" cases, such as White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc.138 In White, the court found that a robot "dressed in a wig, gown,
and jewelry" and acting like a game show hostess potentially violated
the publicity rights of Vanna White, the famous hostess of the TV
show Wheel of Fortune.139 White herself, however, was nowhere in the
picture. The only elements that appeared had a clear, independent
meaning: an attractive, blonde figure turning a letter block simply
symbolizes a generic game show hostess. Under this analysis, White
might have a right of publicity claim if her face were in the image
because her face was not necessary to express the idea, but she would
not have a valid objection against the generic elements.
Only in extreme cases would the whole person become generic.
By this, I mean that all names and images associated with the
celebrity would enter the public domain, even personal images that
have no relationship to the famous person's public self. For example,
photographs of the celebrity as a child would not be protected. Of
course, if such images are unrelated to the famous person's public
image and, therefore, are not well known, they might not have
commercial value anyway. Genericide of the whole person would be
quite unusual because genericide itself is a rather extreme case.
140
Indeed, in trademark law, trademarks only rarely become generic.
Given that people continually reinvent themselves during their
lifetimes, creating new personas or changing the meaning of existing
personas, it seems that genericide of the whole person should apply
only after the person's death. After death, celebrities can no longer
reinvent themselves and reclaim the public meaning of their
identities. Furthermore, it is much less likely that a dead celebrity's
image on a product would be interpreted as an intentional
endorsement, since the celebrity did not have a choice in the matter.
After death, the personas created by the celebrity are essentially
frozen in time. Additional meaning poured into the persona is largely
created by the public and should belong to the public.

971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.), amended by No. 90-55840, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
138.
19253 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 1992).

139.

Id. at 1396, 1399.

Naturally, the trademark must be quite well known to become a synonym for
140.
the product. In addition to the genericized trademarks discussed supra in Part II.A, I have
only been able to find two more. See Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-18
(1938); Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir.
1989).
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B. Adjusting Genericideto the Uniqueness of Human Beings
Just as people are vastly more complex than products, people
are also vastly more individualized. For example, it is relatively easy
to create two identical photocopiers; it is impossible to create two
identical human beings. 141
The problem that arises from this
difference is that the celebrity's image or name will always refer, to a
certain extent, to the celebrity herself. Thus, "thermos" might refer to
all airtight, insulated beverage containers, but the name "Elvis" will
always refer, at least partly, to the person-there is only one Elvis
Presley. This raises the question of how to separate the person from
the independent meaning.
Trademark law resolves the problem of dual meanings fairly
simply with the primary significance test. The primary significance
test recognizes that people may simultaneously recognize "thermos" as
referring to a class of products and to a brand. 142 The test, then, is
what the primary significance of the word is to the consumer, not all
the associations a consumer may have with the word "thermos."143 In
the same way, the primary significance to the public of an image of fat
Elvis in a white, sequined jumpsuit may represent a particular style
and era, rather than just the identity of the human being, Elvis
Presley.
The stakes are higher, however, in the right of publicity context
than in trademark law because the public's association with the
individual celebrity is likely to be greater than a consumer's
association with a brand. As discussed, a human being is so unique
that the individual celebrity's name or image will always have a
strong role as identifier. As a result, it is harder to extricate the
independent meaning from the identification function of the celebrity's
image.
The tendency to recognize a human face immediately may have
more to it than just the uniqueness of each human being. Scientific
studies suggest that human brains are wired to recognize and
distinguish individual faces. 144 Indeed, face recognition appears to be
141.
not imbue
142.
143.
144.

It may be frivolous to point out that even if you could clone people, you could
those people with exactly the same experiences.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2000).
See id.
JOHN J. RATEY, M.D., A USER'S GUIDE TO THE BRAIN: PERCEPTION, ATTENTION,

AND THE FOUR THEATERS OF THE BRAIN 316 (2001); see also Daniel Tranel & Antonio R.
Damasio,
Neuropsychology
and
Behavioral Neurology,
in
HANDBOOK
OF
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 119, 132-33 (John T. Cacioppo et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing
prosopagnosia-the ability to recognize faces). Specific parts of the brain are dedicated to
recognize human faces. RATEY, supra, at 316. Studies show that people with damage in
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tied to specific parts of the brain that seem to have evolved for the
purpose of distinguishing individuals. 145 The ability to distinguish
words, in contrast, is not so closely linked to recognizing a specific
person. 146 As a result, it is probably more difficult to re-direct a
person's understanding of the primary significance of a face from its
source-identifying function to some independent meaning.
Arguably, this difference between celebrities and trademarks is
just a question of degree. It would simply be more difficult to find
genericide in the right of publicity than in trademarks using the
primary significance test. However, this does not make it impossible
to apply genericide to publicity rights. On the contrary, courts
147
distinguish fine shades of meaning all the time.
Moreover, it makes sense that the hurdle before losing the
right of publicity through genericide should be higher than the hurdle
for trademark. As discussed above, there are other justifications for
the right of publicity besides the source-identification function. 14 8 In
particular, an individual's control over her image is widely
acknowledged to be important to her sense of personal dignity and
autonomy. 14 9 Thus, the hurdle to losing control of one's persona (or an
aspect of one's persona, as discussed above) should be higher than it is
in trademark.

these parts of the brain cannot recognize or distinguish faces, even those of people they
have known their whole lives. Id.; Tranel & Damasio, supra, at 132-33. But see Caroline
Williams, Hello, Strangers, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 25, 2006, at 34-37, for cognitive
neuroscientist Isabel Gauthier's counter-argument that the ability to recognize faces is
simply part of the brain's general ability to make distinctions.
145.
RATEY, supra note 144, at 314-16. Ratey notes:
Being able to recognize faces is an important part of the human repertoire of
social behaviors. For one thing, it is essential for survival, a key to determining
whether a friend or foe is approaching. It is also essential to maintaining social
relationships, and even social status (another kind of survival), by identifying
others of a higher, lower, or similar status and regulating behavior accordingly,
and impairment here can be devastating.
Id. at 315.
146.
The ability to distinguish other characteristics is generally not impaired by
damage to the parts of the brain that control the ability to recognize faces. Id. at 316-17;
Tranel & Damasio, supra note 144, at 132-33.
147.
See supra note 137.
148.
See supra text accompanying note 127.
149.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995);
Haemmerli, supra note 3, at 385-86. The right of publicity, after all, originated in the right
of privacy. See Thomas Phillip Boggess, Cause of Action for an Infringement of the Right of
Publicity, 31 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 121 (Clark Kimball & Mark Pickering eds., 2006); 1 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 2:1-2, at 81-83 (2d ed.
2007). As Shakespeare noted: "He that filches from me my good name Robs me of that
which not enriches him, And makes me poor indeed." THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF
SHAKESPEARE QUOTATIONS 306 (Mary Hoakes & Reginald Foakes eds., 1998).
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However, using the primary significance test sets the hurdle at
the right point. When the primary significance of a celebrity's name to
the public has an independent meaning-such as "Einstein"-the
celebrity has already lost control. 150 The celebrity's persona, or the
aspect of the celebrity's persona, has become so well known that the
public has appropriated it into the public dialogue. At that point,
society defines what the word or image means; it has passed beyond
the control of the celebrity into the public domain.
Moreover, there is no need to create a higher hurdle than the
primary significance test because the primary significance test will
naturally be a high hurdle in the context of the right of publicity.
Given the human tendency to recognize an individual by her face, the
symbolic meaning of an image would have to be quite overwhelming to
become of primary significance to the viewer. As a result, it seems
that the difference between trademark and publicity rights holds the
answer in how to treat them. The remaining question becomes how to
extricate independent meaning from an image's source-identifying
meaning. In other words, what do people understand when they look
at an image of the celebrity?
Fortunately, there is a fairly easy way to determine whether a
celebrity's persona has acquired meaning in the public domain
independent from the source-identifying meaning. Part IV of this
article proposes a test to make that determination. The right of
publicity tends to protect only against commercial use, not against
informational or entertainment use. 151 Consequently, the names and
images of famous people are bandied about constantly in the
entertainment and informational media.
Informational uses are
probably not very useful for determining multiple meanings, but
entertainment uses, like parody, jokes, dramatic representations, and
so on, clearly demonstrate the additional meanings and associations
with a celebrity's persona.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF GENERICIDE TO THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY

The preceding Part attempted to parse out the principal
differences in how genericide would apply to publicity rights. Human

150.

Einstein has, in fact, entered standard dictionaries. See, e.g., THE NEW

SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES, VOL. 1 790 (Lesley

Brown ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1933) (defining "Einsteinian" as "[o]f, pertaining to,
or characteristic of the German-born US physicist Albert Einstein (1879-1955) or his
theories"); see also RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 625 (2d ed. 2001).

151.

See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 22, at 1602-06.
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beings are obviously not perfect parallels to the products at issue in
trademark law. However, these differences could be overcome by
separating out generic aspects of a celebrity from the celebrity's
identity as a whole, and by setting a high bar to distinguish between
the identifying function and independent meaning of a celebrity's
persona. This Part will show how a court would determine whether
an aspect of a celebrity's persona had become generic.
A. The Test
The test to prove genericide should be whether the aspect of
the celebrity's persona at issue has been used in the public dialogue
with a clearly separate meaning over a long period of time. The intent
of this test is to show that the primary significance to the public of a
celebrity's persona has an autonomous meaning, separate from its
function of identifying the individual. The test does so by requiring
that the public has not only appropriated and invested the celebrity's
persona with independent meaning, but that the particular use of the
celebrity's persona has become embedded in the culture.
In conducting this test, it makes sense to consider the
celebrity's written name separately from the celebrity's visual image
for two reasons. Firstly, a name is not as distinct as an image. Many
people have the same name, but, except for identical twins, faces and
bodies are quite unique. Secondly, as discussed above, the human
brain seems uniquely adapted to recognizing and distinguishing
Therefore, a celebrity's image should be analyzed
faces. 152
independently from her name because the primary significance of each
53
to the public is likely to be different.'
The "clearly separate meaning" would be the most difficult
element of the test to prove, especially in the context of the use of a
celebrity's name. A court would have to look to popular language and
the media to see how the celebrity's persona is used in public
communication and what the use means to the public. Trademark law
has well-established tests for genericide that can be readily translated
to the right of publicity. 54 A court could look to whether the word is
155
commonly used as a verb or adjective, rather than just as a noun.
For example, if people commonly said, "I got Elvis-ed" to describe

152.
the name,
153.
154.
155.

See supra text accompanying notes 144-46. The old trope, "I may have forgotten
but I never forget a face," certainly rings true in common experience.
For similar reasons, a celebrity's voice should be analyzed separately as well.
See Ingram, supra note 103, at 161-62.
McKinney, supra note 103, at 30-31.

2008]

APPLYING GENERICIDE

getting dressed up in a white, sequined jumpsuit, it would be a strong
indication that the use has become generic. Use of the celebrity's
name in the creation of new words provides another indicator of
156
genericide.
These tests work for words, but images are more difficult. As
discussed above, it is harder to extricate independent meaning from a
celebrity because a celebrity's persona has an inherently stronger
identifying function. 157
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, in Expressive
Genericide: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation,provides
a helpful articulation of the difference between the identifying
function of a mark and its independent meaning-which she calls the
"expressive" function. 158 Dreyfuss notes that many trademarks have
expressive functions beyond mere source identification.1 59 She gives
the word "olympic" as an example. 160 "Olympic" has been designated
by law to be the trademark for the Olympic Games,16 1 but, at the same
time, "olympic" serves "[tlo recall the tenets of the ancient Greeks and
to evoke their spirit of cooperation, mutual acceptance, and
international friendship." 162 Dreyfuss seems to be suggesting that a
trademark owner cannot hold a monopoly over an idea, only over a
source-identifying mark. 63 The King-Seeley Thermos Company, for
example, could not stifle trade in airtight, insulated drink containers
by retaining control over the one word, "thermos," that described the
product. 64 Drawing a parallel to publicity rights, Elvis Presley
Enterprises could not hold a monopoly on the Elvis style by refusing to
65
allow his name or image to be used at "The Velvet Elvis" lounge.'
For Dreyfuss, then, the determinative issue in finding a mark
to be generic is whether the meaning of the mark can be expressed in
an alternative way. 66 If there is no other way to express the meaning,
156.
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 62, at 421.
157.
See supra Part III.B.
158.
See Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity,supra note 62, at 400.
159.
See id. at 418.
See id. at 404-20.
160.
161.
36 U.S.C. §§ 220501-220529.
162.
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 62, at 413.
163.
See id. at 414-16.
164.
King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 578-79 (2d Cir.
1963).
165.
See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
166.
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 62, at 418, 421-22. Dreyfuss argues
that this test goes to the heart of genericide. See id. She contends that we should "drop the
fiction of consumer confusion, and instead focus on the primary concern, which is the
expressive significance of the mark." Id. at 419. An objection to using Dreyfuss' concept of
"expressive significance" is that expressive significance is not the standard for genericide in
trademark law. The standard for genericide in trademark law is that "the principal
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then ownership of the word or image has come to monopolize the ideas
the word expresses. 167 This indicates clearly that the mark has a nonsource-identifying meaning because it is essential to communication.
Dreyfuss' alternative word or image test is an excellent final
test to prove that a celebrity's persona has independent meaning. For
example, if the overblown, gaudy style of the 1960s cannot be
expressed without a picture of Elvis painted on velvet, then clearly
that image of Elvis has attained an independent meaning. Not only
does this aspect of Elvis' image express a definite meaning, but, also,
it is so unique and robust that no other image or words can adequately
replace it.
Finally, whether a celebrity is deceased should be an important
factor in determining whether their image or name has attained
independent meaning. 168 People are unlikely to think that a dead
celebrity endorsed a particular product. Even if the right of publicity
is inheritable, the connection between the product and the star is
considerably attenuated when the celebrity's estate makes the
merchandising decision.
After showing that an independent meaning exists, a
defendant attempting to establish genericide would next have to show
significance of the word to the public becomes the indication of the nature or class of an
article, rather than the indication of the article's origin." Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc.,
692 F.2d 1250, 1254 n.10 (9th Cir. 1982). To a certain extent, the "nature or class" meaning
of a word is the word's "expressive significance," as opposed to the word's source-identifying
significance. Thus, the "nature or class" meaning and the "expressive significance" can be
conflated. Dreyfuss, however, goes further by finding that the "expressive significance" is a
function of context. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity, supra note 62, at 420. For example, a
nonprofit group selling t-shirts with a message involving a trademark would have a better
"expressive genericide" defense than a purely commercial company selling a similar t-shirt.
See id.
I would stay closer to the traditional trademark definition of genericide than Dreyfuss'
definition. Dreyfuss seems to take genericide closer to the First Amendment by requiring
an analysis of how much expression-or speech-is suppressed by enforcing the trademark
monopoly. Id. at 419-22. She would even take into account the intent of the party using the
trademark. Id. at 419. The primary significance test, in contrast, is not contextual. See
Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989);
Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 666-67 (7th Cir. 1965); Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Rather, the primary significance
test is concerned with either what the average consumer, see Donald F. Duncan, Inc., 343
F.2d at 666-67; Bayer Co., 272 F. at 509, or what a "substantial majority of the public," see
Murphy Door Bed Co., 874 F.2d at 101; King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 579, would
understand in the average situation. It is a higher bar, because it does not take account of
special situations (e.g., a nonprofit) to the extent that Dreyfuss advocates. See Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity, supra note 62, at 420-21.
167.
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity,supra note 62, at 418.
168.
Many states allow post-mortem rights of publicity. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978); Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc.
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 705 (Ga. 1982).
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that the meaning of the celebrity's persona has entered popular
language. The purpose of this inquiry would be to establish that
anyone familiar with mainstream culture would understand this
meaning of the celebrity's persona. A defendant would have to show
use across the media gamut: books, newspapers, magazines, Internet,
radio, television, movies, etc. 16 9 Given the easily-accessible data on
distribution and viewership, it should not be hard to prove that the
average American would be familiar with a given meaning of a
celebrity. The Internet makes the analysis of what the public thinks
even easier since, in some measure, it captures actual conversation
across blogs, chat rooms, and the like. Another aspect of the test
might be whether the defendant's use of the celebrity's image would be
viewed by the segment of the population familiar with the
independent meaning, or to a segment to which the use would appear
to be an endorsement. Naturally, in the former use, the defendant
would have a stronger genericide defense.
The final prong is whether the use has occurred over a long
period of time. The goal here is to prove that the meaning associated
with the famous person is not a mere cultural "flash in the pan," but
has permanently entered the lexicon. At least ten years would be
necessary to observe this effect, although the choice of a particular
70
number would be somewhat arbitrary. 1

A good example of this kind of analysis is the survey of trademark use across
169.
fifty years of post-war literature. See Monroe Friedman, The Changing Language of a
Consumer Society: Brand Name Usage in PopularAmerican Novels in the Postwar Era, 11
J. CONSUMER RES. 927 (1985).

The test for genericide proposed in this article echoes the test to determine
170.
whether a mark is "famous" in trademark dilution: "(i) The duration, extent, and
geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized
by the owner or third parties[;] (ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of
goods or services offered under the mark[; and] (iii) The extent of actual recognition of the
mark." See 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2007). Similarly, the test introduced in this
article attempts to determine whether a celebrity's persona has a famous independent
meaning. As in the trademark dilution test, duration is a helpful measure of famousness
because it helps to show that the meaning has become entrenched in the public
consciousness over time. The trademark dilution test is a totality test. Id. ("In determining
whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the court may consider all
").
The test proposed here could also be a totality test rather
relevant factors, including ....
than a required factor test. For the time being, however, the test proposed uses
conservative, minimum requirements rather than requiring a balancing of factors. While
any choice of a duration requirement is arbitrary, this article proposes ten years because it
conservatively doubles the time required under the Lanham Act as prima facie evidence
that a trademark that has been used continuously in commerce has acquired secondary
meaning. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(o (2000) ("The Director may accept as prima facie evidence
that the mark has become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant's
goods in commerce, proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark
by the applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of
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B. The Terminator:A Case Study

Elvis is a fairly easy case of a celebrity whose image has
become partly, if not completely, generic. Taking a more marginal
case better demonstrates how genericide would work in practice.
Arnold Schwarzenegger is a celebrity who has achieved worldwide
fame due to his bodybuilding, acting, and, most recently, political
careers. 171 He is still alive and in the process of changing his image to
suit his political ambitions. Nevertheless, his most famous image is
probably the "Terminator"-a humanoid robot programmed to be a
172 If
perfect fighting machine that appeared in three popular movies.
any aspect of Schwarzenegger has become generic, it would be the

"Terminator" character.
Imagine a hypothetical case in which an insect extermination
company developed a new name for the business, "Terminator." The
new logo features a large, muscular man, looking somewhat like

Schwarzenegger, wearing black leather and sunglasses, and holding
an extermination kit. In most states that recognize the right of
publicity, Schwarzenegger would have a strong case for violation of his
right of publicity. The extermination company has used his "name,
likeness [and] indicia of identity" for its commercial gain.173

The question of whether Schwarzenegger has rights in the
terminator persona is far from merely academic. In 2005, for example,
Schwarzenegger inked an endorsement deal with several fitness
magazines that earned him at least five million dollars. 74 Moreover,
Schwarzenegger actively protects his rights by suing infringers. 175 In
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., for example,
distinctiveness is made."); Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., Inc., 493 F.2d 275, 282 (8th
Cir. 1974) ("Secondary meaning is a common law concept and the protection afforded a
distinctive mark under the Lanham Act is substantially identical to that provided by the
common law." (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)). Similarly, this article's proposed test
is intended to show that a celebrity's persona has acquired a secondary meaning.
171.

MICHAEL BLITZ & LOUISE KRASNIEWICZ, WHY ARNOLD MATTERS: THE RISE OF A

CULTURAL ICON vii-ix (2004).
172.

TERMINATOR 3: RISE OF THE MACHINES (C-2 Pictures 2003); TERMINATOR 2:

JUDGMENT DAY (Canal+ 1991); THE TERMINATOR (Hemdale Film 1984).
173.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) is typical of state
statutes: "One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using
without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability." See, e.g., CAL. C1V. CODE § 3344 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1103 (West
2001).
174.
Andrew Pollack, Schwarzenegger is Drawing Fire for an Ad Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 15, 2005, at Al.
175.
See, e.g. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir.
2004).
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Schwarzenegger sued an Ohio car dealership for printing
advertisements with an image of the "Terminator" and the words,
176
"Arnold says: 'Terminate EARLY at Fred Martin!"'
1. "Terminator"-The Word
While the "Terminator" originally was only a movie character,
the word "terminator" is almost certainly generic. 177 First of all, it
meets the classic trademark tests for genericide. "Terminator" is used
as an adjective in a wide variety of contexts; it has also been formed
into new words. 178 Thus, for example, Tara Lipinsky was termed the
"Taranator" after her figure-skating win in the 1998 Winter
Olympics. 79 More famously, Schwarzenegger has been called "The
80
Governator" after winning the governorship of California.'
Secondly, it has a distinct meaning that is readily apparent
from the variety of contexts in which it is used. Essentially, it seems
now to mean an unstoppable agent that overwhelms all opposition. It
has taken on the connotation of professional dominance, such as in the
sentence "It's not Chief Gates behind the desk; it's Terminator Gates:
he can't be reasoned with, he can't be argued with, he's programmed
only to go forward."''
It can also mean athletic excellence. For
example, Nancy Reno's friends call her "The Terminator" in women's
professional volleyball. 8 2
The connotation of excellence and
invulnerability is used to describe products too, as in the article
describing Mercedes' G-wagen, The Terminator of SUVs. 18 3 Even
scientific literature uses the term. The title of an article on chemical
termination of protein synthesis at the cellular level ran, The

176.
Id. at 799. The suit was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 807.
177.
Terminator is also a trademark owned by Studiocanal Image S.A., but I will not
consider the possibility that the trademark itself has become generic and, instead, will
focus on right of publicity genericide. See Terminator, Trademark Registration No.
2,249,579 (filed Apr. 20, 1998).
178.
For tests of genericide, see Ingram, supra note 103, at 161-62, and McKinney,
supra note 103, at 30-31. Turning the word "terminator" into a verb is a moot point because
the word "terminate" already exists.
179.
Randy Harvey, In Stunner, Lipinsko Becomes Youngest Olympic Figure Skating
Challenge, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1998, at N1.
180.
Paul Harris, Governator Set for Hit Sequel, THE OBSERVER (ENGLAND), Aug. 20,
2006, at 26.
181.
BLITZ & KRASNIEWICZ, supra note 171, at 105 (internal quotation omitted).
182.
Id. at 106 (internal quotation omitted).
183.
Kathleen Kerwin, The Terminatorof SUVs: Mercedes' Pricey G-wagen Outguns
its Off-road Rivals, BUSINESS WEEK, Apr. 24, 2000, at 182.
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18 4 The wide range of contexts in
Methylator Meets the Terminator.
which "terminator" is employed goes to show its sturdy independence
from its original source. A word with only a narrow source-identifying
meaning would not be so useful. Now, however, "terminator" makes
sense in very different uses because it refers to the abstract concept
described above.
Further, the term and concept of "terminator" has become
irreplaceable. The definition provided above-an unstoppable agent
that overwhelms all opposition-is certainly long and unwieldy. Even
that definition does not convey the impact and connotations of
"terminator."
The connotation of a humanoid fighting machine
holding an automatic gun is necessary to the word's usefulness.
Nothing else quite conveys the "unstoppability."
The second step in the test shows that the word is understood
to have this meaning across American culture.
The preceding
examples certainly indicate that "terminator" has entered the
language in many different ways. However, the test should require
proof that the average American has been exposed to this use. In the
case of "terminator," the prevalence of the word's use indicates that
the average American understands the non-source-identifying
meaning. The "Taranator" reference above, for example, appeared in
The Los Angeles Times, a newspaper with a distribution of
approximately one million. 8 5
Business Week, a magazine with
circulation of nearly one million, l8 6 published the title, "The
Terminator of SUVs."'' 7 References have occurred in The New York
Timesl 8 8-with
a circulation of roughly 1 million 8 9-People
0
Magazine19-with
a circulation of 3.7 million' 9 1-and
Time

184.
Steven Clarke, The Methylator Meets the Terminator, 99 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
SCI. U.S.A. 1104 (2002), available at http://pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?
artid=122150.
185.
Jon Friedman, The L.A. Times is Dying by a Thousand Cuts, MARKETWATCH,
Nov. 13, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/la-times-dying-thousand-cuts/story
.aspx?guid=%7B680edlae-67c8-465d-b499-cOb7893faO31%7D&siteid=mktw&dist=more
news.
186.
BusinessWeek Selects EDS to Manage CRM Subscription Fulfillment, PR
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 20, 2001.
187.
188.

Kerwin, supra note 183, at 182.
Tim Weiner, The Nation: Terminator, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, at 41

(discussing the use of government-paid assassins in the war on terror).
189.
New York Times Media Kit, available at http://www.nytimes.whsites.net/
mediakit/docs/circanddemos/NYTsundayweekdaycirc.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2007).
190.
Christina Cheakalos & Johnny Dodd, Kid Friendly: Successful as an Author,
Mellower About Hollywood, Jamie Lee Curtis Learns to Laugh Over Spilled Milk, PEOPLE
WKLY, Sept. 25, 2000, at 127 ("She was so driven and frenetic, Curtis says, friends called
her Terminator.").
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Magazine192-with a worldwide readership of about 5.6 million. 193 The
use of "terminator" in such mainstream publications certainly
indicates that the independent meaning of "terminator" as an
"unstoppable agent" is understood by the average American.
The third prong of the test requires that the word have been
used with independent meaning over at least ten years. "Terminator,"
it turns out, has been used with independent meaning for more than
twenty years. In 1985, for example, Herbert Hafif, a successful trial
lawyer, described himself during trial: "I can get myself into a zone of
competitiveness where I'm the Terminator."1 94
The use of
"terminator" as an independent descriptor in the language applicable
in many different contexts has spanned a generation. As a result,
"terminator" appears to be fully ensconced in the national language.
Clearly, the word "terminator" has become generic.
2. "Terminator"-The Image
It is naturally more difficult for the non-source-identifying
meaning of an image to have primary significance to the public. As
discussed, the public's association of a celebrity's image with his
identity is probably always stronger than with the celebrity's name.
Nevertheless, I would argue that the image of the "Terminator" has
also become generic.
First of all, the image has the same clear, independent
meaning as the word: an unstoppable killing machine that looks like a
super human. The image is quite distinctive. As the Ninth Circuit
stated in Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co.: "Throughout
much of the film, Schwarzenegger, as the Terminator, maintains a
stern demeanor and wears black sunglasses.
This image of
Schwarzenegger is highly distinctive and immediately recognizable by

191.
David Carr, Brash Owner of Rolling Stone Struggles to Remake Us Weekly, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at C1.
192.
Ron Stodghill, Ending the Whitewash, TIME MAG., Dec. 27, 1999, at 141 ("The
N.A.A.C.P. president cast himself as the leading man, a swaggering yet politically correct
Terminator of all things racist about Tinseltown.").
193.
Emma Hall, The Editor's Vision-International Business Magazine Editors
Strive to Maintain the Brand Identities of Their Titles While Tailoring Them to Appeal to
Local Audiences, CAMPAIGN, Oct. 27, 2000, at 17.
194.
Kim Masters, Trial Heavyweight on a Roll, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 1985, at 1;
see, e.g., Robbie Andreu, Wisconsin Badgers, Bullies Miami 88-66, SOUTH FLORIDA SUNSENTINEL, Dec. 8, 1985, at Sports 1, ("Ripley and Weber, who are both 6-foot-7 and weigh
215 pounds, were twin terminators. Ripley scored 19 points and had 13 rebounds and
Weber had 11 points and 11 rebounds."); Marc Fisher, 'Reborn' Colson Keeps the Faith,
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 11, 1985, at 1B ("In the White House days, Chuck Colson, Richard
Nixon's political terminator, never gave interviews.").
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much of the public."1 95 A combination of some, but not necessarily all,
of the following characteristics immediately conveys the idea: a large,
muscular man wearing sunglasses and a leather jacket, carrying a
machine gun, with one red eye, and part of the face torn off to reveal
steel and wires. Thus, for example, the head of a pig with one red eye
wearing sunglasses clearly evokes the "Terminator," although the
other elements are missing.196
Indeed, the presence of
Schwarzenegger himself in the image is not necessary to convey the
idea.
At the same time, however, when Schwarzenegger's face is
used in the image, the use still does not necessarily convey
endorsement. The image is typically used to convey the idea of
overwhelming unstoppability, rather than to express a connection to
Schwarzenegger the person. For example, Mad TV created a skit with
a Schwarzenegger look-alike in which the "Terminator" goes back in
time to save Jesus from being crucified. 197 The joke of the skit was
that even Jesus could not stop the "Terminator" from foiling the divine
plan.198 This example of a parody may not be pure commercial use,
but it does show what the image means to the public.
Moreover, as with the word "terminator," this independent
meaning of the image is understood by the average American as
evidenced by its pervasive presence in the popular media. For
example, the skit on Mad TV was watched by approximately 2.7
million people. 19 9 There have also been skits on Saturday Night
Live. 200
The "Terminator" has even become an internationally
understood symbol, from masks in the United Kingdom 20 1 to comic
books in New Zealand. 20 2 Like the use of the word, the "Terminator"
image has been used with a clear, independent meaning for at least

195.
374 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2004).
196.
George's Terminator Page, http://www.geocities.com/georgianesther/t3.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
197.
YouTube-Terminator
(jesus parody),
http://youtube.com/watch?v=8pUrs

UORF4Y (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
198.
Id.
199.
Paula Bernstein, Will TV Skits Boost Webs' Laughing Stock?, VARIETY, Mar. 26,
2001, at 34.
200.
See, e.g., Saturday Night Live: Linda Hamilton/MariahCarey (NBC television
broadcast Nov. 16, 1991) (featuring a skit entitled "The Tooncinator," where staple
character Toonces, a driving cat, appears as a cyborg dressed in a black leather jacket and
sunglasses, impervious to car crashes and gun fire).
201.
See, e.g., Silly Jokes-Terminator Mask, http://www.sillyjokes.co.uddressup/masks/ char/terminator.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2007).
202.
See, e.g., Roderick Hannah, Terminator Crossover, 38 TIME SPACE VISUALIZER,
Mar. 1994, available at http://nzdwfc.tetrap.com/archive/images/38terminator.html.
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ten years. 20 3 The "Terminator" image has also clearly acquired iconic
status.
V. OBJECTIONS TO APPLYING GENERICIDE TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The advantages to applying genericide to the right of publicity
can be summed up quickly, but they go to the heart of the flaws in
publicity rights. The primary criticism of the right of publicity is that
it curtails free speech. 20 4 Genericide alleviates this problem by
making many of the expressive elements of a celebrity's persona
available in speech. Ideas that cannot be expressed without using an
aspect of a celebrity's image would be returned to the public domain
when the idea is the primary significance of a celebrity's aspect to the
public. Secondly, genericide addresses the cultural studies critique
that the right of publicity gives celebrities ownership of meanings
created by the public. 20 5 When an element of a celebrity's persona has
independent meaning for the public, it would enter the public domain.
Thirdly, genericide provides a logical, common law limit to a tooexpansive right. That is, when a celebrity has effectively lost control
of his image to the public, genericide simply recognizes that reality.
Objections to genericide would most likely stem from the fact
that the right of publicity is supported by justifications foreign to
trademark law. This Part will address whether genericide makes
sense in light of the five rationales (other than endorsement) for
publicity rights. In addition, trademarks have defenses against
genericide that the right of publicity lacks. This Part will also discuss
whether these rationales and defenses should affect genericide in the
right of publicity.
One of the justifications for the right of publicity is a laborbased Lockean argument. 20 6 A celebrity, so the argument goes, should
own the commercial value of the public image she has built through
persistent effort over the years. 20 7 As Madow observed, however, the
process of becoming famous is generally not directly linked to a
celebrity's own efforts. 208 Assuming even that an icon's fame is really
due to her hard work, labor invested has never been a bar to

203.

See Saturday Night Live, supra note 200 (showing independent meaning dating

back to at least 1991).
See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
204.
205.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995); Madow,
206.
supra note 1, at 182-83.
207.
See Madow, supra note 1, at 182-83.
208.
Id. at 182-96.
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A trademark rarely achieves
genericide in trademark law. 20 9
widespread recognition without the expenditure of millions of
advertising dollars.2 10 Nevertheless, neither this effort nor even the
effort expended by a company to prevent its trademark from becoming
generic averts genericide. 211 A celebrity's rights to the investment in
creating her image seem particularly weak in comparison to
trademark law because it is very rare that the celebrity's own money
is spent to build her public persona. 21 2 While the owner of the
trademark typically spends the money to advertise the brand, most
celebrities become famous due to advertising expenditures made by
the movie studio or recording company, or simply because the media
picks up her story. 213 In short, in trademark law, a company is only
allowed rights to a word because it serves to identify the source of the
product, not as a reward for expending money and effort to build the
brand. 21 4 It is hard to explain why the same calculus should not apply
to the right of publicity.
The other side of the labor rationale is the unjust enrichment
rationale. Not only should a celebrity be allowed to reap what she has
sown, goes the argument, third parties should not be allowed to reap
what someone else has sown. 21 5 In other words, other people should
not be allowed to profit from another individual's identity. The same
arguments apply here as apply to the labor rationale. There does not
Ingram, supra note 103, at 159-60 (noting that the genericide process 'can be a
209.
harsh one for it places a penalty on the manufacturer who has made skillful use of
advertising and has popularized his product"' (quoting King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin
Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963))).
See, e.g., CareFirst of Md., Inc. v. First Care, P.C., 434 F.3d 263, 266 (4th Cir.
210.
2006) ("This umbrella organization has spent millions of dollars advertising its mark; in all
of its advertisements, it denominates itself 'Carefirst BlueCross BlueShield,' often
accompanied by the distinctive Blue Cross Blue Shield logo."); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group,
391 F.3d 439, 450 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[Plaintiff] spent over $20 million on advertising in 2002
and has achieved annual revenues of $675 million.").
For example, in the case of the formerly trademarked term "thermos," the
211.
Second Circuit court found "that the generic use of 'thermos' had become so firmly
impressed as a part of the everyday language of the American public that plaintiffs
extraordinary efforts commencing in the mid-1950s came too late to keep 'thermos' from
falling into the public domain." King-Seeley Thermos Co., 321 F.2d at 579. See also Donald
F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 667 (7th Cir. 1965), where the
trademark owner of "yo-yo" tried to popularize a generic substitute to the word, but "yo-yo"
was still found to be generic. The Seventh Circuit stated: "Plaintiff has made a herculean
effort to fasten upon the toy the generic term, 'return top,' as is evidenced by the manyperhaps hundreds-of times which the term is employed in its pleadings." Id. at 662.
See Madow, supra note 1, at 191-96.
212.
Id.
213.
Lanham Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (2000).
214.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c (1995); Madow,
215.
supra note 1, at 196-205.
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seem to be a strong reason that the celebrity should profit from her
fame when it may often be a matter of luck. 2 16 This is particularly the
case in genericide when the public has often appropriated the image
and infused it with a new, independent meaning.
A more utilitarian justification for the right of publicity is the
idea that publicity rights provide an incentive for people to become
famous. This justification has been criticized on two grounds. Firstly,
it is questionable whether we want to encourage people to become
famous, because they often become famous for reasons that contribute
little to the public's welfare. 2 17
Secondly, people already have
adequate incentive to become famous in terms of wealth, attention,
Genericide is just an extension of the second
and adulation. 218
criticism. At the point that a celebrity is so wildly famous (and,
therefore, probably wealthy) that his name or image has become a
byword, the loss of a few merchandising dollars would not discourage
aspiring celebrities.
Nor does the right of publicity make sense in the case of
reluctant celebrities, such as those who become famous because of a
scandal. If the celebrity is embarrassed by the attention, it is unlikely
that she would want to merchandise the embarrassing image that has
become generic. Therefore, the reluctant celebrity does not suffer a
financial loss when others exploit the merchandising market. With
regard to a reluctant celebrity's humiliation, if the persona has become
famous enough for genericide, she has already been ridiculed in
entertainment and informational contexts. The commercial context is
unlikely to make a difference.
A second utilitarian rationale is that publicity rights should be
privately owned in order to prevent dilutive commercial use. 21 9 In the
first place, excessive use does not seem to dilute the value of a name or
image. As Michael Madow pointed out, "[a] Madonna T-shirt may be
worth more, not less, to consumers precisely because millions of her
fans are already wearing them." 220 Madow explains this phenomenon
by a desire to belong. However, genericide may provide an additional
explanation. An image gains new meaning partly due to the fact it is
widely used. Only well-known images can take on a new meaning
because an image must be broadly understood in order to have a

216.

Madow, supra note 1, at 185-91.

217.
218.

Id. at 216-19.
Id. at 206-15.

219.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. c;Madow, supra note
1, at 220-25.

220.

Madow, supra note 1, at 222.
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communicative function-that is, everyone has to get the joke. An
image's communicative function provides more reason to wear the
image. Therefore, the addition of a new meaning increases the value
of the image or name rather than diluting it. Moreover, if the image
has obtained a new, independent meaning because of extensive use,
this new meaning has probably been created by the public.
Consequently, it makes less sense to reserve to the celebrity
opportunities to exploit the image's increased value.
The last justification for publicity rights is a moral argument
that control over one's image is necessary for personal dignity and
autonomy. 221 Alice Haemmerli, in Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian
Right of Publicity, argues that individuals have a personal bond to
their image and name, and that this connection should constitute a
separate basis for a property right. 222 Although this makes intuitive
sense, it is an innovation that has not actually been applied to any
area of property law. 223 In any case, the idea loses some of its force in
a case of genericide. In genericide, an image or name has lost its
source-identifying primary significance to an independent meaning
created by the public. As a result, a celebrity's connection to the
image is more attenuated.
Moving back to a comparison with trademark genericide, the
right of publicity lacks the dilution cause of action to defend itself from
genericide. As commentators have noted, the introduction of antidilution laws has slowed the process of genericide for many existing
trademarks. 224 Trademark holders can enjoin uses that involve
peripheral meanings of the trademark, thereby nipping the creation of
new meaning in the bud. The right of publicity has no similar cause of
action. However, there are strong arguments that anti-dilution laws
are overbroad and harmful. 225 Those same arguments apply against
introducing the dilution to the right of publicity.
Arguably, another problem with extending genericide to the
right of publicity is that celebrities do not have the same ability to
fight genericide as do companies holding trademarks. This problem
has two parts. The first is that even quite successful celebrities would

221.
See Haemmerli, supra note 3, at 411-22.
See id. at 423-24.
222.
This statement is made with the possible exception of the Visual Artists Rights
223.
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
224.
See, e.g., Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a Reconciliation with
the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 139-43 (1995).
See David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a Coherent
225.
Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
117, 118 n.2 (2004).
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not have the same resources as a corporation to create an antigenericide advertising campaign. Although a movie studio, a music
producer, or the media may have paid for the advertising that created
the value of the celebrity's image in the first place, these corporations
have little interest in protecting the celebrity's right of publicity. For
example, a movie studio might want to protect a trademark it owns for
a movie that stars the actor, but not the actor's own right to publicity.
This argument, however, just re-emphasizes the extent to which the
value of a celebrity's persona is essentially a windfall for that
celebrity. It does not make sense to argue that law should protect the
publicity side-benefit to the celebrity of advertising paid for by others.
Secondly, celebrities might find it difficult to create
alternatives for their names and images. However, entertainers could
potentially come up with screen names instead of their given names.
226
Images could possibly be replaced with stylized evocations.
Trademark owners are also often challenged to think of a catchy
substitute name for a product. Companies, such as Donald F. Duncan,
Inc., for example, failed to popularize "return top" as an alternative to
the term "yo-yo."22 7 This difficulty does not prevent genericide of the
trademark and should not prevent its application in the context of
publicity rights.228
The final objection to publicity right genericide is that it gives
celebrities the wrong incentives. 229 Arguably, celebrities would feel
compelled to litigate against generic uses constantly in order to avoid
losing this right of publicity. The increased litigation would waste
resources. Most of the genericizing process, however, would occur in
the areas that the celebrity could not control-the informational and
entertainment contexts-because the right of publicity only protects
commercial use. Thus, the process of genericide might already be
complete by the time the celebrity's name or image was used in a
commercial context. The celebrity would have little incentive to bring
the lawsuit at that point because she would have little chance of
winning.

226.
eyebrows,
227.
1965).
228.
229.

For example, instead of Groucho Marx's face, the image might show bushy
a mustache, and glasses.
Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 343 F.2d 655, 662-67 (7th Cir.
See supra text accompanying note 216.
Madow, supra note 1, at 207-15.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Genericide would reground the right of publicity in its
endorsement rationale and limit it with an established common law
principle.
Some limitation seems necessary because the right of
publicity's expansion in recent years has further untethered it from its
already questionable justifications.
At the very least, the
endorsement rationale makes about as much sense for the right of
publicity as it does for trademark.
Genericide would limit the
attenuation between the right of publicity and its endorsement
function by requiring that the celebrity's identity actually be the
primary significance of the celebrity's name or image to the public. At
the same time, genericide would respect the celebrity's dignity and
personal autonomy. That is, genericide would limit publicity right
protection to only those cases in which personal identity is really at
issue. Uses of the celebrity's persona that only evoke the celebrity, for
example, to express a non-source-identifying meaning would fall
under genericide.
Moreover, genericide would occur in extreme
situations where the remaining justifications for the right of publicity
are already stretched thin. For example, the exclusive right to
merchandise for a celebrity already so famous her name has become a
byword is not a necessary incentive to encourage people to become
famous. Most importantly, genericide would protect a considerable
amount of free speech. Ideas that have become inexpressible without
a celebrity's name or image would return to the public domain. This is
simply a recognition that famous people are an important part of our
language and culture. Celebrities cannot claim exclusive commercial
rights to everything their names and images have come to mean.

